Halfway Up To the Mathematical Infinity: On the Ontological and
  Epistemic Sustainability of Georg Cantor's Transfinite Design by Belaga, Edward G.
ar
X
iv
:0
81
2.
32
07
v3
  [
ma
th.
GM
]  
9 F
eb
 20
09 Halfway Up To the Mathematial Innity I:
On the Ontologial & Epistemi Sustainability
of Georg Cantor's Transnite Design
Edward G. Belaga
November 3, 2018
Abstrat
Georg Cantor was the genuine disoverer of the Mathematial In-
nity, and whatever he laimed, suggested, or even surmised should be
taken seriously  albeit not neessary at its fae value. Beause along-
side his exquisite in beauty ordinal onstrution and his fundamental
powerset desription of the ontinuum, Cantor has also left to us his
obsessive presumption that the universe of sets should be subjeted
to laws similar to those governing the set of natural numbers, inlud-
ing the universal priniples of ardinal omparability and well-ordering
 and implying an ordinal re-reation of the ontinuum. During the
last hundred years, the mainstream set-theoretial researh  all in-
sights and adjustments due to Kurt Gödel's revolutionary insights and
disoveries notwithstanding  has ompliantly entered its eorts on
ad ho axiomatizations of Cantor's intuitive transnite design. We
demonstrate here that the ontologial and epistemi sustainability of
th! is design has been irremediably ompromised by the underlying
peremptory, Redutionist mindset of the XIXth entury's ideology of
siene. Our analysis and prompted by it synthesis lead to: (i) the
extension of the well-known two-terms foundational opposition
CN : {existence by axiomatic consistency ⇒ notational existence},
to its novel, four-term axiomati viability riterion RSCN :
{ontological relevancy ⇒ onto− epistemic sustainability ⇔ CN},
reduing ZF and its extentsions to the status of interative program-
ming languages manipulating ad ho ontrived, pure notational innite
totalities, (ii) the new ontologial insights into the nature of the on-
tinuum inspired by the quantum-mehanial entanglement argument,
and (iii) the interpretation of Cantor's lass of all ountable ordinals
ω1 as an authenti, universal, ever emerging and never ompleted ordi-
nal sale of the power and sophistiation of iterative logial arguments.
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I was beside the Master raftsman,
delighting him day after day,
ever at play in his presene,
at play everywhere on his earth,
delighted to be with the hildren of men.
Proverbs 8:30-31
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1 Introdution
1.1 Cantor's Mission and His Peremptory Amalgams
Georg Ferdinand Ludwig Philipp Cantor, 1835-1918, the genuine disoverer
and the rst foreful olonizer of the Mathematial Innity's mountain range,
was not just a sientist and mathematiian: the powerful thinker of a strong
spiritual bent, he was a missionary  or, at least, so was he himself pereiving
his sienti voation, systematially pursuing it as the mission to shed a new
intelletual and, hopefully, spiritual light into the mystery of the Innite.
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It has never been easy to be a missionary, and as many other missionaries
before and after him, Georg Cantor has fallen vitim to the most sustained
and ruel perseution  in his ase, aademi. The rejetion and the ridiule
were so unforgiving  espeially, on the part of Leopold Kroneker, his el-
der and highly regarded olleague, the editor of the most prestigious Ger-
man Mathematial magazine who onsidered Cantor a sienti harlatan,
a renegade, a `orrupter of youth'  [14℄ (p. 1)  that Cantor's mental health
has greatly suered. He died in the mental institution unaware of the long
overdue reognition his work nally reeived, in partiular, from the London
Mathematial Soiety.
There is no doubt that, alongside Cantor's health, the intelletual free-
dom, transpareny, integrity, semantial relevany and, ultimately, the on-
tologial and epistemi sustainability of his sienti quest suered as well.
Most tragially, Cantor himself has been fully aware of this:
But despite the seeming thoroughness of it all, the speial results of trans-
nite arithmeti did not ompensate for the major aw in Cantor's entire
presentation [of his results in the major seminal paper of 1897  EB℄. The
ontinuum hypothesis remained unresolved, as did the questions of whether
every transnite power was an aleph, whether the transnite ardinals were all
omparable, and whether every set ould atually be well-ordered. Through-
out the entire presentation, in fat, there was a nagging sense that something
was not quite right. ([14℄, p. 194)
Was it the psyhologial hardship aggravating the usual professional pres-
sure to deliver the new ideas and results as fast and as strong as possible, or
just the exitement to disover the new and innite terra inognita, with
its exquisite in beauty ordinal onstrution and its fundamental powerset
desription of the ontinuum?
Whatever might be the reasons, the inesapable fat is that Georg Cantor
has obsessively preipitated and stoially maintained the imposition of his
original, overbearing global transnite design, marked from our point of view
by a grave ontologial insuieny, epistemi arbitrariness and driven by his
Redutionist methodologial presumptions, as follows:
First, sets should be subjeted to laws similar to those governing the
set of natural numbers, inluding the universal priniples of ardinal ompa-
rability and well-ordering implying ultimately an ordinal re-reation of the
ontinuum. This minor, suggestive, and relatively benign type of Cantor's
redutionism, with a lowerase r , has been exposed and analyzed on sev-
eral oasions (f., e.g., Mihael Hallett's [28℄), albeit without any remedies
proposed.
Seond, the Universe of sets, or the Absolute, exists in the sense that
is available to us as a whole for manipulation and, eventually, total formal
4
ontrol.
This last, absolute type of Cantor's redutionism should not be onfused
with his or Gödelian or, for that matter, Finslerian Platonism whih is in
priniple ompatible with an open, emerging universe of ideas about sets.
Rather this militant Redutionism, forefully imposing its pre-oneived, on-
tologially rigid and epistemily arbitrary designs on the laws of the domain
one is supposed to disover and not to invent, was the produt of the ideo-
logially uniform, peremptory mindset of the XIXth entury's philosophy of
siene (f. Setion 4.4).
The result, as we see it, is most dispiriting: during the last hundred
years, the mainstream set-theoretial researh, all insights and adjustments
due to Kurt Gödel's revolutionary disoveries and insights notwithstanding,
has ompliantly and without great suess entered its eorts on ad ho
axiomatizations of Cantor's transnite blueprint  from Zermelo-Frenkel's
Axiomatis to Axioms of Large Cardinals.
And yet, all suh hindsight, bakward reproahes notwithstanding, it is
with the greatest delight and most sinere gratitude that we aknowledge here
the importane for the present study of Georg Cantor's original optimisti
phenomenologial and ontologial vision of the Mathematial Innity.  The
vision intelletually most penetrating and epistemily both most general from
a mathematial pratitioner's point of view and most generous from the
point of view of a logiian and a philosopher, has been one of the prinipal
inspirations of the present study (Setion 7.1).
Our analysis and prompted by it synthesis will result in:
(i) The extension of the well-known two-terms Platoni⇒ formal  foun-
dational opposition
CN : {existence by axiomatic consistency ⇒ notational existence},
to its novel, four-term axiomati viability riterion (Setions 2.3, 4.2)
RSCN : ontological relevancy ⇒ onto−epistemological sustainability ⇔ CN},
reduing ZF and its extentsions to the status of interative programming
languages manipulating ad ho ontrived, pure notational innite totalities
(Setion 4.5).
(ii) The new ontologial insights into the nature of the ontinuum  the
insights inspired by the quantum-mehanial entanglement argument (Se-
tion 4.5).
(iii) The interpretation of Cantor's lass of all ountable ordinals ω1 as
an authenti, universal, ever emerging and never ompleted ordinal sale of
the power and sophistiation of iterative logial arguments (Setion 3.1).
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1.2 Objetives and Results
Thus, one of the most important onlusions of our analysis will be the
disavowal of Cantor's denition of the rst unountable ordinal ω1  the
ordinal of the well-ordered set of all ountable ordinals  and the ardinal
ℵ1 assoiated with it as a sheer notational gimmik void of any unountable
ontologial substane  even if as suh ertainly helpful in notational designs
of some very large ountable ordinals [50℄.
To some degree, our argument here will parallel that of the non-existene
of the ordinal of all ordinals, famous beause of its role in the foundational
risis in the beginning of the XXth entury, and is inspired by the modern
researh on large ountable ordinals [47℄, with its systemati extension of our
iterative upward mobility when searhing for denitions of new, ever more
fast growing ountable ordinals  leading to our interpretation of Cantor's
olletion, or lass, ω1 of all ountable ordinals as the ever emerging ordinal
measure sale of the iterative power and sophistiation of our formal logial
endeavors (f. Setion 3.1).
Deprived of its rst unountable ordinal, Cantor's ordinal theory of the
ontinuum fails, with his Continuum Hypothesis retaining only its original,
naif, non-ordinal interpretation (f. Setion 2.5).
Consequently, we are faed with the hallenge to look for new, non-
Cantorian ontologial insights into the nature of the ontinuum  the in-
sights whih ould be eventually formalized by new set-theoretial axioms
(f. Setion 6).
Ours will be a still informal but far-reahing extension of the entangle-
ment argument borrowed from quantum theory and the theory of quantum
omputation[46℄ (f. Setion 6.1).
Armed with these novel transnite insights and arguments, we abandon
here for good both the framework of the lassial set-theoretial reasoning
rmly rooted, all protestations to the ontrary notwithstanding, in the XIXth
entury's redutionist paradigm of mehanisti ausality and the losely re-
lated to it  in fat, impliitly underlying, even if postdating it  lassial
theory of omputation, formalized by Alfonso Churh and Alan Turing (f.
Setion 6.1).
It is this theory whih, in the absene of any formal alternative of a
omparable importane, is deemed today by many to somehow stand for
the theory of human thinking, with Cantor's aforementioned fundamental
law of thought being a lear tributary to suh a redutionist, outdated,
but still beguiling philosophial appeal. Emboldened by our new insights
into the Transnite, we will onlude the present study by a disussion of
an alternative approah to the essentially non-algorithmi, extemporaneous,
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reative human thinking (f. Setion 7.4).
Some of our novel ontologial and epistemi insights and suggestions are
easily lending itself to appropriate formalizations in the today universally
aepted Zermelo-Frenkel's set-theoretial framework suitably adjusted to
our needs.
This is the ase of our understanding of the nature of Cantor's rst un-
ountable ordinal ω1: its immediate formal denitions (f. the notations in
Setion 3.1)
ω1 = {α ∈ On | α is countable} =
⋃
α is a countable ordinal
α
are either involving the General Comprehension Sheme with the ondition
ountable whih, as we laim, is not even denite (f., e.g.,[45℄, p. 20) beause
involving the veriation by ounting to the innite, or appealing to Zermelo's
Fixed Point Theorem ([45℄, p. 73) oming at the heels of his well-ordering
theorem whih, in its turn, needs the full power of the Powerset Axiom and,
for the sake of a formal justiation of Cantor's onstrution of ω1, proves in
our ase too muh to make this onstrution redible.
Other oneptual novelties of this study need new instruments of formal-
ization whih are at hand, too. Two partiular traks of suh an eventual
formalization are followed in our forthoming papers [8℄, [9℄.
We feel, however, that the full axiomatization of our blueprint of the
Mathematial Innity should be the subjet of a separate presentation. This
is why all formal aspets of our study are kept here to a minimum  in on-
sequene making eventually our paper aessible to a general mathematial
reader.
1.3 Bibliographial Note and Aknowledgments
The historial remarks let drop above and below do not represent a history
of either Cantor's disoveries, or its anteedents and sequels. Our hoie
is restrited to a few important for what follows oneptual breakthroughs
whether, in our opinion, they are fully, or only partially, or not at all justied
by the further developments [7℄.
The interested reader ould nd mutually omplementing aounts of the
emergene and development of pre-Cantorian, Cantorian, and post-Cantorian
Set Theories in the following papers and monographs listed aording to the
alphabetial order of their authors to whom the present author expresses his
most sinere gratitude: Joseph Warren Dauben [14℄, Solomon Feferman [18℄,
Mihael Hallett [28℄, Thomas Jeh [33℄, Akihiro Kanamori [35℄, Penelope
Maddy [41℄, and Gregory H. Moore [44℄.
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Author expresses his profound gratitude to these authors
2 Epistemi Prequel to the Advent of Ordinals:
Plain Continuum Standing Alone and High
2.1 Prelude
It was originally the usually overlooked or intentionally ignored sandal of
the undervaluation of the importane of the ontinuum, ompared to that of
Cantor's ordinal invention, as a prieless ontologial soure of the intuition
into the Innite that has struk a raw nerve with the author [4℄, [6℄ and
ultimately prompted the present oneptual revision.
The epistemi and methodologial roots of suh a gross distortion, as
well as the general historial and ultural predispositions to it are elui-
dated below, Setions 2.4, 2.5, as a prelude to our original approah to the
foundational hallenge posed by Mathematial Innity  the hallenge whose
meaning and importane were buried under the debris of diverse axiomati
and tehnial aommodations of Cantor's primeval transnite design.
This is why, in the present hapter, we have hosen rst to revise in a
free, leisurely, and informal way some basi and vital onepts and ontologial
insights onerning the ontinuum, the onepts and insights oming both
from Greeks and modern mathematis, but mostly forgotten, ignored, or
hastily and unritially absorbed by the Cantorian and post-Cantorian set
theories  if not irremediably rushed under the weight of their ever growing
transnite tower, with its top eventually reahing heaven.
We aompany these revisions by informal and indiative for what follows
hints of our prinipal insights, motivations, expetations  briey, of the
driving intuitions behind the present study.
2.2 Antiquity: an Innity Flashbak
Heralitus is the one who rst
delared the nature of the innite
and rst grasped nature as in itself
innite, that is, its essene as proess.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrih Hegel
Vorlesungen über die Geshihte der Philosophie
Before Georg Cantor has entered the sene of mathematial innity, two
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types of innite totalities  the ountable and the ontinuum, both re-
disovered and radially re-mastered by Cantor  were already well known
experimentally to the mainstreamWestern mathematial and philosophial
ommunities, starting with those of Anient Greee.
In fat, the Greeks have been the rst to disover and olonize two basi
innite mathematial habitats, the set of natural numbers denoted today
N, or (Cantor's notations) ω or ω0, and the real line ontinuum R whih
have remained ever sine both the most fundamental and widely used by
modern pratitioners of Mathematis, of Computer Siene, and of Sienes
at large, with their innite sizes, or powers, aording to Cantor, denoted
respetively
∣∣ ω
∣∣=
∣∣ ω0
∣∣= ℵ0 and
∣∣ R
∣∣= c.
These habitats existed for the Greeks as they exist for us, present-day
mathematial yokels, independently of any formal or axiomati justiations,
but simply beause they represent the indispensable, intuitively lear, and
intelletually reliable mediums for beautiful mathematial theories rih in
fruitful appliations:
Among mathematiians, there is a widespread view that ongoing urrent
mathematis on the whole is more reliable than any of the philosophially
motivated programs that have been proposed to replae it, and that the only
foundations that need be onsidered (if any at all) is organizational. [20℄
Being well aquainted experimentally and fully omfortable theoretially
with two basi numerial and geometri universes N and R, the Greeks were
fully onsious of the ontologial dierenes between these two innities, as
is abundantly lear from the famous paradoxes advaned by Zeno of Elea
(a. 490 BC  a. 430 BC) ([12℄ p. 26; [2℄ pp. 54-57).
In partiular, Zeno's paradox Ahilles and the Tortoise learly demon-
strates the pereived by its author oneptual inompatibility between two
dierent types of human experienes: the external, existential on the one
hand and the inner, intelletual, and in partiular mathematial, on the
other hand  the experienes nurturing two dierent onepts of innity.
The rst type, assoiated today with the ontinuum onept, emerges
from our observations of the external world viewed as an innite and ontin-
uous one- or more-dimensional ow: the ever-hanging skies, the waters of a
river, the ight of an arrow, a running athlete, et etera.
The seond type, taking its origins in the human intelletual ativity, is
best enapsulated by all sorts of the ounting experiene  through obser-
vations of heart-beatings, walking as a step-by-step movement, building of
towers, et.  and represents the only humanly available and never-ending
aumulation of innity by nite and disrete portions  and so on.
Zeno, like Heralitus before him, learly doubted that the two innities
ould be reoniled: one an run, but one annot adequately understand or
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otherwise fully and exhaustively apture in a purely intelletual way, and
in partiular formally, this phenomenon, beause our reasoning proeeds by
nite and disrete steps, by disrete markers or buoys oasionally dropped
in the moving waters, whereas our and the river movement  a mystery in
itself  is, as an ever-hanging fae of a river, ontinuous:
On those stepping into the same river, other and other waters ow (Her-
alitus of Ephesus, a. 535  a 475 BC)
One should not be surprised to disover that Zeno's paradoxes remain of
interest to modern philosophers as well. Thus, for instane, Henri Bergson
(1859-1941) is thoroughly disussing and forefully explaining them anew
in his book [10℄ (pp. 1259, 1376, 1377).
Making the Point 1 : Austere Ontologial Realism and Epistemi
Disretion of the Greeks. Heralitus' and Zeno's visions are far from
being Platoni. In their austere and minimalist epistemi way, they do not
suppose the existene of an independently and objetively existing idea of
the reality ow, the idea whih ould be somehow and somewhen adequately
and denitively aptured by philosophial or mathematial formalizations. In-
stead, in the spirit of their austere ontologial realism, they expet us to live
in the presene of this ow  the ow thought of as an ever ongoing, fully
external to us, independent of us, and most rih phenomenologially proess.
The proess to be patiently observed, experimented with, et.  with the ex-
petation that we will be able with time to aquire new intelletual insights
and intuitions somehow explaining this proess, the intuitions suseptible
to be eventually theorized and formalized.
2.3 From Formal to Platoni Existene, and Beyond.
It is lear that neither Georg Cantor, nor Kurt Gödel, nor for that matter,
Paul Finsler quoted below have shared suh an extreme epistemi disretion
and ontologial prie sensitivity  hoosing instead the Platoni vision of
mathematial abstrations as objetively existing, diretly aessible to us
theoretial realities, without being initially inspired by prolonged and are-
ful existential observations and experimental onsiderations, to be ultimately
distilled from them as it were as pure abstrat onepts and relationships:
Finsler's attitude towards mathematis was Platonisti in a very denite
sense: he believed in the reality of pure onepts. Together they form the
purely oneptual realm whih enompasses all mathematial objets, stru-
tures and patterns. ... Mathematiians do not invent or onstrut their
strutures and propositions, they reognize, or disover, how these objets
in the oneptual realm are interrelated with eah other. It is lear that if
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there exists a oneptual realm, then it must be absolutely onsistent; hene
existence implies consistence. ... The Platonistic perspective
of mathematis an be expressed by the onverse impliation: Consistency
implies existence. If a onept has been found to be onsistent, it an be
assumed to exist. This means that one an nd properties and prove theorems
about it. ([21℄, p. 3)
Now omes the Formalist. Sarred by logial paradoxes whih no Platoni
fore ould exorise, he is onerned only with the orret formal, notational
existene and, respetively, formal dedutibility of formal statements not
leading ultimately to the ontradition 0 = 1. Aording to David Hilbert's
axiomati manifesto, axioms are not taken as self-evident truths: the elemen-
tary notions, suh as point, line, plane, and others, ould be substituted by
tables, hairs, glasses of beer, et. It is their dened relationships that only
matter and are disussed.
Or, as Abraham Robinson puts in the the innity ontext whih is here
of main interest to us:
My position onerning the foundations of Mathematis is based on the
following two main points or priniples. (i) Innite totalities do not exist
in any sense of the word (i.e., either really or ideally). More preisely, any
mention, or purported mention, of innite totalities is, literally, meaningless .
(ii) Nevertheless, we should ontinue the business of Mathematis `as usual',
i. e., we should at as if innite totalities really existed. ([49℄, p. 230)
Robinson's above the brawl  statement of the limited formalist liability
for any innity risks undertaken by Mathematiian both resembles and
starkly ontrasts with the innity onept of Aristotle, whih in its realisti,
hands-on approah surpasses in our opinion even the Platoni readiness to
engage into the mathematial innity ombat.
The following statement from Aristotle's Physis (Phys. III, 7, 207b27-34;
the translation is borrowed from [31℄, p. 201), antiipates the modern ultra-
intuitionisti ritiism of, say, Alexander Yessenin-Volpin [63℄ and expliitly
raises the problem of the philosophial ausality priniples universally but
impliitly underlying our mathematial queries (f. below Setion 6.1):
Our aount does not rob the mathematiians of their study, by disprov-
ing the atual existene of the innite ... In point of fat they do not need
the innite and do not use it. They postulate only that the nite straight line
may be produed as far as they wish. It is possible to have divided in the same
ration as the largest quantity another magnitude of any size you like. Hene,
for the purposes of proof, it will make no dierene to them to have suh an
innite instead, while its existene will be in the sphere of real magnitudes.
As a matter of fat, it was Georg Cantor who has denitely demonstrated
that mathematiians do need the innite and they do use it (f., e.g., Se-
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tion 3.1), notwithstanding the oasional expressions of doubt oming from
our ontemporaries  from approvingly ondent (Innity in Mathemat-
is: Is Cantor Neessary ?  [18℄) to paniky deserting (Abraham Robinson
quoted above).
The point is what do we need it for, how do we use it, and what might be
the best workable and adequate philosophial and mathematial aount of it :
Making the Point 2 : Extending the Platoni-Notational Interplay
into the Reality Context.
(1) We express the interplay between Platoni and formal (notational)
existene by the epistemi impliation
CN : {existence by axiomatic consistency ⇒ notational existence},
(2) It goes without saying that we do not deny, neither are we dismis-
sive of, nor ondesending to Platoni and formal mathematial dedution
games whih respet only one limitation and riterion of existene: the on-
sisteny of their ever extending axiomati systems. Rather are we onerned
here with another, and for that matter, ruial for us question: how far away
and astray from the initial, fundamental aspirations and insights of our query
into the innity  and ultimately, in what sort of a barren wilderness with no
return  are suh games presently leading us [5℄, [6℄, Setion 4.5.
(3) As Greeks before us, the majority of modern mathematiians ould not
be satised with the exlusivity of the epistemi impliation CN pretending to
dismiss as mathematially irrelevant or to ignore altogether the Ontologial
Relevany, the soure and, through the Ontologial and Epistemi Sustain-
ability link, the nal judge of the Reasonableness, i.e., Veriable Expliative
Strength of objet-oriented  in this partiular ase, Continuum oriented 
mathematial theories.
(4) Hene our four-term reality extension of the above epistemi impli-
ation CN (f. also Setion 4.2):
RSCN : {ontological relevancy ⇒ onto−epistemic sustainability ⇔ CN}.
2.4 Putting the Epistemi and Proedural Prie Tags
on the Cantorian Powerset Abstration
Georg Cantor has resolved (1874) one partiular aspet of Zeno's Ahilles
and the Tortoise paradox, formally onrming Zeno's intuition, by introdu-
ing the method of one-to-one orrespondene, or bijetion, to both identify
innite totalities of the same power, or equipotent totalities, and to establish
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whih of two totalities is bigger. With this ame his rst, topologial proof
that the set of reals is unountable.
Another one of Cantor's ingenious and powerful methods, that of diag-
onalization (1891), has permitted him to prove even in a more diret and
onvining way that the ontinuum has the power stritly bigger than that
of a ountable totality, c > ℵ0.
Finally, Cantor has identied an operation (1891) ating on sequenes
of natural numbers, whih re-reates the ontinuum from the totality of
sub-totalities of the enumerable set N of natural numbers. In the nite ase,
the similar operation applied to a set with n elements produes a set with
2n elements  hene the term the powerset onstrution, P, the one-to-one
orrespondents P(N) ∼= R, and the equality 2ℵ0 = c.
Could all these original onepts of Cantor be understood by Greek
philosophers and mathematiians? And would they agree that Cantor's
powerset onstrution P(N) ∼= R somehow invalidates Zeno's laim of the
inompatibility of our two soures of intuition of the Mathematial Innity,
ontinuous and disrete?
At any rate, it is lear that any relevant explanatory argument addressed
to the Greeks should be adapted to their austere proedural realism:
(1) What do we mean by point of the ontinuum, the line, whih is,
for Heralitus, Zeno and even Eulid, just a gure of an ever hanging ow?
How ould one assign to this point a subset of natural numbers and what is
the prie of suh an assignment?
(2) Vie versa, what do we mean by subset of natural numbers? How
ould one assign to it a point on the ontinuum and what might be the prie
of this assignment?
(3) And nally, what it means and how one might be sure that our
proedures over all points and all subsets ?
Now, even a brief analysis of Cantor's powerset onstrution applied to
the set of natural numbers demonstrates that it does not invalidate but, quite
to the ontrary, vindiates Zeno's intuition and deepens its impliations:
(1) The bijetion P(N) ∼= R is far from being symmetri and proedu-
rally evenhanded. As a matter of fat, given a well-dened subset of natural
numbers, one is relatively free to mark a point on the ontinuum by on-
struting the orresponding real number with the help of, say, the ontinuum
fration devie.
(2) To proeed, however, in the opposite diretion, from a point well-
dened algebraially, analytially, or by another expliit, surng over the
ontinuum ow proedure  distint from the disrete in its nature powerset
onstrution  to a subset of natural numbers, one would need to exeute
an algorithm (suh as the algorithm of Eulid alulating the orresponding
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ontinuous fration from, say, a given system of equations) with a generally
speaking innite number of steps.
(3) The irregular and unpreditable disontinuity harater of Cantor's
powerset onstrution points in the same diretion: the passage from the
marker of a point on the ontinuum ow to the marker of another one is
aidental, irregular, whereas the ow itself is moving along at every one of
its points ontinuously and uniformly.
(4) Moreover, we have no hope to ever reah all points of this ow: not
all propositions of the form
α is a transcendental number
are expressible, or denable in a language, sine there are unountably many
transendental numbers (Finsler, 1926; f. [21℄, p. 8.)
Making the Point 3 : Negligibility of the Impat of Our Oasional
Stepping into the Continuum Flow.
(1) Alternatively to the stepping into a ontinuum ow, one an see
Cantor's powerset devie as sort of a saolding of the ontinuum skysraper
under perpetual onstrution, with eah partiular subset of natural numbers
dening a transendental number α being a disreet, sequential ladder of
asent, typially innite, to α (f. the epigraph to Chapter 6.2 below).
(2) Our usage, above, of the qualier well-dened applied both to real
numbers, or points of the ontinuum, and to (innite) subsets of natural
numbers is as intuitively transparent and informal as the one systematially
employed by Cantor (f., e.g., his law of thought statement in the above
Setion 1.1).
(3) It means that, without speially restriting the interpretation of
well-dened to onstrutively dened, aording to one or another version
of Construtivism, one an safely assume that the human ativity, whatever
might be its intensity, sophistiation, and prolongation, might be able to atu-
ally probe individually into only ountable many points of ontinuum and,
respetively, subsets of natural numbers.
(4) The extension of these apparently innoent observations about Can-
tor's powerset mahinery of reahing out for points on the ontinuum to
well-dened subsets of the ontinuum will have substantial impliations for
Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis: f. the next setion.
(5) The suggested limits of this mahinery do not prelude the existene
of other  analyti, algebrai, number-theoreti, et.  methods of reahing
out for the Unountable. The interplay between suh non-set-theoreti and
set-theoreti methods is disussed in the next setion.
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2.5 Continuum Hypothesis: From Point Centered to
Subset Centered Set Theory
Now omes Cantor's radial oneptual leap from the point-entered to the
subset-entered approah to the theory of Continuum, and at this oneptual
threshold  leading, as David Hilbert laimed ([30℄, p. 376), into the paradise
Cantor reated for us from where no one shall be able to drive us  we
have to abandon for good our Greek ompanions, albeit not their astute,
austere epistemi methodology.
To start with, Cantor has advaned (1878) the rst, naif version of his
Continuum Hypothesis, whih has appeared later as number one on the fa-
mous list of most important unsolved mathematial problems presented by
David Hilbert during the Mathematial Congress at the University of Sor-
bonne, Paris, in 1900:
Conjeture 1 CHWE: Continuum Hypothesis in Its Weak Equipo-
teny Form. Given a well-dened sub-totality of the real line, X ⊂ R, it is
either empty, or nite, or ountable, or equipotent with the ontinuum.
This weak equipoteny version of the Continuum Hypothesis, leaving to
its prover to speify the subset of the ontinuum whose power she/he wants
to ompare with the four known powers, ts perfetly into Cantor's early
mathematial experiene (1872) of expliit onstrution of innite sets of
onvergeny points of trigonometri series. After introduing perfet sets,
Cantor was able to prove CHWE for all losed sets. This was the beginning
of Desriptive Set Theory [37℄
For better or worse, this has not been the end of the story. Being inspired
by a muh more radial vision of the disrete-ontinous opposition than Zeno,
Cantor freed himself of all fetters and manipulated the set onept without
any restrition  as Hermann Weyl puts it disapprovingly in [60℄ (p. 50). In
partiular, Cantor's full equipoteny version of the Continuum Hypothesis
deals not with arefully speied sub-totalities, but either with any sub-
totality or with the olletion of all sub-totalities of the ontinuum:
Conjeture 2 CHFE: Continuum Hypothesis in Its Full Equipo-
teny Form. Any sub-totality X of R is either nite, or ountable, or
equipotent with the ontinuum.
This exerise assumes, impliitly or expliitly, the existene of the power-
set of the ontinuum and thus extends the portability of the original Canto-
rian powerset onstrution beyond the ountability ase, where its legitimay
has been assured by the analytially dened bijetion R ∼= 2N, with the two
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mathematial habitats N and R well known experimentally and opera-
tionally long before the invention of the powerset gadget:
This does not prove the legitimay of the [universal℄ powerset priniple.
For the argument is not: we have a perfetly lear intuitive piture of the on-
tinuum, and the powerset priniple enables us to apture this set-theoretially.
Rather, the argument is: the powerset priniple (or priniples whih imply
it) was revealed in our attempts to make our intuitive piture of the ontin-
uum analytially learer; in so far as these attempts are suessful, then the
powerset priniple gains some onrmatory support. ([28℄, p. 213.)
Making the Point 4 : Cantor's Innite Powerset Constrution Is
Fully Context-Dependable. The immediate and obvious extension of the
above prie-sensitivity analysis, Setion 2.4, demonstrates the ontext-depen-
dable harater of Cantor's innite powerset operation P(S),S being an in-
nite set: this operation is designed to at on, and only on the ountable
type of suh sets, and it is meaningfully and ultimately formally sustainable
only in this ontext. All other appliations of this operation to innite sets,
as e.g., in the ase of the set P(R) of all real funtions of one variable
whose ardinality is denoted by f = 2c, are pure set-theoretial notations,
ertainly useful as suh, but ontologially void of any veriable referene to
an objetively observable, meaningful reality ontext.
Hene the following Thesis  the priniple or onjeture whih speies
only partially or informally, or leaves open altogether an important segment
of its formal assumptions  going bak to Cantor's original insight, similar
and, as we believe, ontologially and epistemially related, prior, and superior
to Churh-Turing's Thesis (f. Setion 6.1):
Thesis 1 : On the Continuum Hypothesis.
(1) Whatever might be a spei extension of the qualier well-dened,
any well-dened subset of the ontinuum is either empty, or nite, or ount-
able, or equipotent with the ontinuum.
(2) The Continuum Hypothesis makes no sense outside the above well-
dened version.
To give the reader a foretaste of possible oneptual realizations of the
qualier well-dened, here is its simplest and popular ordinary mathematis
version:
We identify as ordinary or non-set-theoreti that body of mathematis
whih is prior to or independent of the introdution of abstrat set-theoretial
onepts. ... The distintion between set-theoreti and ordinary mathematis
orresponds roughly to the distintion between `unountable mathematis' and
`ountable mathematis. ([55℄, p. 1)
16
2.6 Cantor's Unrestrited Uses of the Powerset Con-
strution
Of ourse, Cantor himself was absolutely free from, in fat, blissfully un-
aware of the eventuality of any ontologial and epistemi misgivings about
unrestrited uses of his powerset devie, the misgivings similar to those raised
above. Quite to the ontrary, the powerset operation was for Cantor not only
universally appliable, but also unrestritedly and eventually transnitely it-
eratively auto-appliable:
Axiom 1 : Powerset
For eah set A there exists a set B, alled the powerset of A,P(A), whose
members, or elements, are the subsets of A.
Now, Cantor's diagonal argument used to prove that the ardinality of
the ontinuum is stritly bigger than that of the set of natural numbers,
Setion 2.4, c = card(R) = card(P(N)) > card(N) = ω, is readily available
for the proof of the general inequality card(P(A)) > card(A), whih gives
rise to Cantor's original transnitely growing hierarhy of set:
N,R = P(N),P(R),P(P(R)), . . .
with their respetive ardinalities
ℵ0 = i0,i1,i2, . . .
It is at this rst ritial junture of the realization of his transnite de-
sign, to assure that every set of the Universe of sets ts at some plae in the
emerging, powerset devie driven hierarhy (with some less dramati adjust-
ments presently delivered by the Axioms of emptyset, pairset, extensionality,
union, et. [45℄) that Cantor needed his Universal Cardinal Comparability
Priniple.
2.7 Cantor's Universal Cardinal Comparability Prini-
ple and Two Ontologially Distint Soures of Sets
>From the point of view of a naif set theory, the universal priniple of ardinal
omparability appeared to Cantor both immediate, natural, and ultimately
more important than that of the his well-ordering law of thought to whih
we turn our attention in the next hapter. And Cantor's disovery (1882) of
the omparative antisymmetry property A <c B and B <c A =⇒ A ∼ B,
known today as Shröder-Bernstein theorem and being a part of what might
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be alled ordinary mathematis (f. the above quote from [55℄), looked like
just the rst, and for that matter promising step in the right diretion.
However, as things stand today, the set-theoretial enforeability of the
universal omparability priniple demands the same axiomati strength as,
and is formally equivalent to Cantor's universal well-ordering priniple (f.,
e.g., [45℄, pp. 120-121).
In other words, this enforeability ame with a prie tag whih, more than
hundred years after Ernst Zermelo's proof of this priniple, is still hounding
the researh into the Innite.
It is instrutive to trae the oneptual and formal breakthroughs leading
to this state of set-theoreti aairs [14℄, [44℄, [28℄. What is still missing, we be-
lieve, in suh analyses is the understanding of the transformation of Cantor's
original theory of the Innite based on two, initially independent ontologi-
al soures of set tokens, ontinuum and ordinal, into his global transnite
design whih was steadily evolving ever sine from favoring the foundational
value of ordinals over that of the ontinuum to unreservedly  and, as we
laim, undeservedly  absorbing the latter by the former.
Whih brings us straight out to Cantor's ordinal invention.
3 Ordinals: Their Awe-Inspiring Beauty, Their
Neessary Uses, Their Peremptory Abuses
A team of Hollywood tehno-wizards set out to `bring 'em bak alive'. So
they took a little artisti liense to make them half again as large. Anyway,
what did books know? Then a surprising thing happened. In Utah, paleontol-
ogists found bones of a real raptor, and it was the size of the movie's beast.
`We were utting edge', says the lm's hief modelmaker with a pathnder's
pride.`After we reated it, they disovered it'. (Andrea Dorfman, Behind
the Magi of Jurassi Park, Times International 1993, n. 17, pp. 53-54.)
3.1 The Beauty and Eieny of Ordinal Constrution
Redux on the Outside the Cantorian Set Theory
Independently of the listed above, Setion 2.4, lassial in their transpareny
and beauty lariations of the fundamental relationships between two known
to Greeks innite mathematial habitats, N and R, Georg Cantor had an
extraordinary in its originality and beauty idea to extend the ounting, or
ordinal attributing, beyond natural numbers  into the invented by him trans-
nite ordinal realm.
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Beame aquainted with Cantor's transnite numbers, David Hilbert, for
one, did not mine the words to praise it:
This appears to me to be the most admirable ower of the mathemati-
al intellet and in general one of the highest ahievements of pure rational
human ativity. ([30℄, p. 373)
Typially of David Hilbert, it was his enthusiasm, and not that of the orig-
inal designer, Cantor (f. the next setion), that proved authenti, propheti
 and totally seless:
(1) Today, nobody is surprised that a researh paper on, say, termination
proof tehniques for Term Rewriting Systems, or TRS, whih play an impor-
tant role in automated dedution and abstrat data type speiations, starts
as follows:
Cantor invented the ordinal numbers
0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , n, n+ 1, . . . ω, ω + 1, . . .
ω2, . . . ωn, . . . ω2, . . . ωn, . . . ωω, . . . ω ↑ n, . . .
ε0, . . . ε
ε0
0
, . . . ε1, . . . εε0, . . . , and so on.
(1)
Eah ordinal is larger than all preeding ones, and is typset of them all:
ω = the set of all natural numbers;
ω2 = ω ∪ {ω + n | n ∈ ω};
ωn = ∪i<nωi;
ω2 = ∪n∈ωωn;
ωω = ω ↑ 2 = ∪n∈ωω
n;
ω ↑ n = ∪i<nω ↑ i;
ε0 = ω
ε0 = ∪n∈ωω ↑ n;
εε0
0
= ωε0
2
;
ε1 = ∪n∈ωε0 ↑ n.
(2)
The notation α ↑ n represents a tower of n αs. ([16℄, p. 243)
Notie that in ommon parlane Cantor invented  or reated , not dis-
overed' ', the ordinal numbers.
After the above most suint and transparent introdution to ordinals,
the author demonstrates how the ordinal desent an be used to prove ter-
mination for partiular lasses of TRS s, with the general TRS termination
problem (a speial ase of the halting problem for Turing mahines) being of
ourse undeidable.
As to the ordinal desent, it is an important speial ase of desent along
partially ordered sets, in partiular, along trees. One of Cantor's most fruitful
ideas has been the notion of a well-ordering, WO, i. e., of a linearly ordered
set fullling the ondition of nite desent, FD, i. e., of termination after a
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nite number of steps of any desending subsequene (ordinals are, of ourse,
speial WOs). The prinipal merit of the FD ondition is the extendibility
of the mehanism of Mathematial Indution beyond natural numbers to any
WO and, in partiular, to any ordinal.
(2) The rst disovery of the neessary uses (aording to Harvey Fried-
man's favorite phraseology and the title of his seminal paper [22℄) of trans-
nite numbers in what has been alled above ordinary mathematis was made
muh earlier  just ten years after Hilbert's pronounement.
Namely, Gerhard Gentzen [24℄ has proved that the validity of the law of
mathematial indution along Cantor's ordinal segment 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . .ω, ω +
1, . . . ε0 , is equivalent to the statement of the onsisteny of Peano arith-
meti. It is worth to mention that, among other things, Gentzen's result
has brought with it a dignied, even if only partial and, for that matter,
ountable rehabilitation of Hilbert's program [48℄.
Gentzen's approah gave birth to Ordinal Analysis whose objetive is to
provide ordinal ertiates for the onsisteny of more or less omplete and
onstrutive fragments of artihmeti and analysis: see the paragraph (5)
below.
(3) About ten years after Gentzen, it was Reuben L. Goodstein who has
disovered an elementary, natural, and yet number-theoretially meaningful
and aesthetially appealing arithmetial proposition of Peano arithmeti [26℄,
readily understandable to high shool students but not provable in Peano
arithmeti  beause any proof of this proposition requires the neessary use
of a transnite indution up to ε0.
Goodstein's has been also the rst meaningful and elementary mathe-
matial statement illustrating in Peano's elementary axiomati framework
the inompleteness theorem of Kurt Gödel. Almost forty years later, Laurie
Kirby and Je Paris, the re-disoverers of the misunderstood and forgot-
ten result of Goodstein, have added to the emerging list of suh elementary
examples their Herules against Hydra battle [38℄.
(4) Then, in 1949, Alan Turing has given a remarkable general interpre-
tation of expliitly dened ountable ordinals as suint symboli notations
for algorithmi strutures with multiple loops [58℄  the interpretation whih
inspired a series of remarkable results on the program veriation illustrated,
in partiular, by the quoted above paper [16℄ .
(5) There is no other eld of mathematis and mathematial logi where
the suggestive, interpretive, and reative power of Cantor's ordinal onstru-
tion is more pronouned and more eetive than Ordinal Analysis whih
builds on and integrates all aforementioned breakthroughs:
The entral theme of ordinal analysis is the lassiation of theories by
means of transnite ordinals that measure their `onsisteny strength' and
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`omputational power'. The so-alled proof-theoreti ordinal of a theory also
serves to haraterize its provably reursive funtions and an yield both on-
servation and ombinatorial independene results. ([48℄, p. 45)
Making the Point 5 : Countable Ordinals as Formal Devies for
Measuring the Onto-Epistemi Limits of Partiular Iterative Meth-
ods.
(1) By their very meaning and formal denition, proof-theoreti ordinals
should be ountable [47℄, [50℄, whih means that the study of more and more
strong axiomati theories goes hand in hand with the never ending upgrading
of the hierarhy of large ountable ordinals:
• from ω to ω2, the proof-theoreti ordinal of RFA, rudimentary funtion
arithmeti;
• ω3 and EFA, elementary funtion arithmeti;
• ωω and PRA, primitive reursive arithmeti;
• ǫ0 and Peano arithmeti;
• Γ0, Feferman-Shütte prediativity ordinal, the proof-theoretial ordinal
of ATR0, arithmeti transnite reursion;
• . . .
• and so on  beyond prediativity, reursive notations, and eventually
 beyond all known today expliit notational and ombinatorial desriptions,
toward new, today unknown and unimaginable iterative insights and devies.
(2) In partiular, Ordinal Analysis provides us with the independent evi-
dene of existene of orresponding ountable ordinals. In other words, after
Georg Cantor has reated them, Gerhard Gentzen, Reuben L. Goodstein and
their followers have disovered them.
Hene the following Thesis whih is aspiring to apture the emerging in
the above ases of Ordinal Analysis general pattern and to extrapolate it
to future breakthroughs in our understanding of, paraphrasing [48℄ (p. 45)
the onsisteny strength, omputational power, and ombinatorial sophisti-
ation:
Thesis 2 : The Onto-Epistemi Interpretation of Cantor's Class
of Countable Ordinals.
(1) The olletion ω1 of ountable ordinals is the authenti, universal,
ever emerging and never ompleted formal ordinal measure sale of the power
and sophistiation of iterative logial arguments and methods.
(2) In partiular, ω1 is a proper lass.
(3) The statement of suh oneptual generality and formal vagueness
annot be either proved, or falsied otherwise than by a disovery of nees-
sary use(s) of ω1 in ordinary mathematis providing an independent evidene
of its existene.
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Disussion. (1) If one assumes the truth of the rst part of the above
thesis, the ontologial justiation of its seond part is readily and naturally
available:
(2) The assumption that ω1 is a set and, thus, ordinal implies roughly
that one an reate a new iterative method by uniting all iterative methods
whih are already in plae or will be ever invented  whih is meaningless.
From the ontologial point of view, the onfusion omes from a substitution
of impliations of the real temporal eternity, whih ould not be amplied, by
those of mathematial innity, whih permits dierent proedures of ever in-
reasing iterative omplexity, to overstep all already diserned and formalized
limits.
(3) At present, there exists no onvining and sustainable results of ne-
essary uses of the Unountable. To give just one example: the method whih
relates the struture of elementary embeddings assoiated with large ar-
dinals to that of self-distributive algebras and braid groups has been later
supplanted by diret, not involving the Unountable proofs [13℄. This ex-
ample illustrates both the methodologial and proof-theoretial rihness of
the existing theories of the Unountable and the eventual ountable inter-
pretability of the uses of suh theories in ordinal mathematis.
We are elaborating the foundational impliations of these informal in-
sights below, Setion 5.
3.2 Cantor's Transnite Design Takes Shape  at a Prie:
a Clear-ut Case of the Abuse of the Ordinal Devie
The above thesis, if true, disqualies both Georg Cantor's denition of the
rst unountable ordinal, Setion 3.1, and the known axiomati foundations
of set theory, suh as ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkel with the Axiom of Choie,
AC), whih ount among their provable statements the well-ordering theo-
rem and, thus, the ordinal haraterization of ω1. The impliations of this
new foundational risis will be disussed in Chapter 5.
But this will happen later ... For now, we still have to patiently follow
the founder of set theory.
Similarly to what happened with the disovery of the powerset operation,
Setion 2.6, it is at this seond ritial junture of the realization of his
transnite design, that Cantor  not giving a damn about the only ordinal
numbers he has atually designed, the ountable ones [16℄, and blissfully
unaware of their future astonishing and brilliant neessary uses [22℄  has
been exlusively interested in their eventual transposal into the domain of
the unountable.
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Ultimately, Cantor sueeded to do this by postulating that the well-
ordered olletion of all ountable ordinals is a set and, onsequently, the
least unountable ordinal ω1 of the ardinality ℵ1.
With this methodologially peremptory, epistemily perfuntory, onto-
logially unwarranted break-in into the unountable, Cantor has nally fully
onsolidated his rm hold on the well-ordered design of the Universe of sets 
leaving to the future generations of mathematiians to gasp air for its viable
axiomati foundations and, among other things, to resolve the pure ardi-
nal interpretation of the Continuum Hypothesis whih suddenly beame its
only oial version (regretfully, even aording to Kurt Gödel's insightful
presentation [25℄):
Conjeture 3 : CHCV : Continuum Hypothesis, the Cardinal Ver-
sion.
Prove that ℵ1 = c = 2
ℵ0, or nd another aleph of the ardinal hierarhy
equal to c.
The striking, almost number-theoreti in its simpliity ordinal-ardinal
interpretation of the original phenomenologial versions of the Continuum
Hypothesis, Setion 2.5, beame so attrative that virtually all speaking
about the Continuum Hypothesis, suh an authority in fundamental mat-
ters as CH , Kurt Gödel inluding [25℄, are formulating it as a onjeture
about ardinals, CHCV , without ever mentioning its more tangible origins.
Today, after more than hundred years of arduous eorts by thousands
of researhers, some share a remote hope that Cantor might get it wrong
and that, in fat, ℵ1 < c = ℵ2 = card(ω2), with ω2 being the olletion of all
ordinals whose ardinality does not exeed ℵ1, or in other words, the ordinals
whih are either nite or ountable or equipotent with the rst unountable
ordinal ω1 . . .
Others, and they are in the majority, either do not are anymore or dis-
own, on foundational grounds of all possible persuasions, the very legitimay
of CH , as in the following statement of Solomon Feferman [20℄ squarely
aiming at the ardinal version of CH :
I ame to the onlusion some years ago that CH is an inherently vague
problem. This was based partly on the results from the metatheory of set the-
ory showing that CH is independent of all remotely plausible axioms extend-
ing ZFC, inluding all large ardinal axioms that have been proposed so far.
In fat it is onsistent with all suh axioms (if they are onsistent at all) that
the ardinal number of the ontinuum an be `anything it ought to be', i.e.
anything whih is not exluded by König's theorem. The other basis for my
view is philosophial: I believe there is no independent platoni reality that
gives determinate meaning to the language of set theory in general, and to
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the supposed totality of arbitrary subsets of the natural numbers in partiular,
and hene not to its ardinal number.
4 Posterior Axiomatizations of Cantor's Trans-
nite Blueprint: Foundational Challenge
In this and next hapters, we are attempting to reonile our ontologial
limitations on both the uses of the powerset devie, Setion 2.6, and of the
set-theoreti status of Cantor's ordinal olletion ω1, Setion 3.1, with the
existing and intensively evolving sine already hundred years theoretial and
formal foundational tradition.
To this end, we revise in the present hapter both (1) the fundamental ex-
pliit and unspoken onto-epistemologial and formal set-theoretial assump-
tions, the bedrok of ZFC axiomatis and its Large Cardinals extensions,
and (2) its almost universally ignored sustainability impliations.
4.1 Ptolemai-like Deadlok of ZF−based and Ever Ex-
tending Axiomatis of the Cantorian Set Theory
In the spirit of Kurt Gödel's legay of pure (meta-)mathematial and de-
tahed of any ontologial onsiderations interpretations of formal axiomati-
zations of set theory, one annot but onlude that Cantor's intuitive per-
eption of the unlimited asension along some platonially pre-existing lad-
der of large ordinals and ardinals ould be formally realized today only at
the prie of the invention of never ending extensions of the ZF axiomati
whih are themselves belonging to some platonially pre-existing ladder of
set-theoretial priniples ...
And so on ? Indeed:
As our edie grew, we saw how one by one the large ardinals fell into
plae in a linear hierarhy. This is espeially remarkable in view of the os-
tensibly disparate ideas that motivate their formulation. As remarked by H.
Friedman, this hierarhial aspet of the theory of large ardinals is somewhat
a mystery ... In other words, is there a hierarhy of set-theoretial prini-
ples in another galaxy above ZFC, disjoint and inomparable to our large
ardinals ?  ([36℄, p. 104)
This paradigm of never ending axiomati adjustments, at any given ax-
iomati junture never suient to settle, say, Cantor's Continuum Hypoth-
esis, reminds us of the Ptolemai millenarian deadlok of unending and ever
more ompliated adjustments of his system of epiyli planetary orbits to
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new, more preise astronomial observations of planets supposedly moving
around the Earth  the theologial (aording initially to the Pythagorean
tradition and later on to the Biblial one), ontologial (aording initially
to Aristotelean and then to sholasti philosophy), physial and, in the line
with all suh religious, ultural, and sienti intelletual ertainties, the
mathematial enter of the observable Universe.
4.2 Ontologial and Epistemi Construals: Consisteny,
Relevany, and Truth
The eventual foundational reperussions of Feferman's above the brawl  pes-
simism (f. the above quote from [20℄, the last setion of the previous hap-
ter) onerning the legitimay of the Continuum Hypothesis, CH , pale into
insigniane ompared to our atual disavowal of the onto-epistemologial
sustainability of the whole Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatis, ZFC, and its Ax-
ioms of Large Cardinals extensions  from the appliability of the powerset
devie beyond its original ountable limits, Setions 2.5, 2.6 (f. Feferman's
nal remark), to the legitimay of the ordinal haraterization of the olle-
tion ω1 of ountable ordinals, Setions 3.1, 3.2.
Our hands-on approah to the foundational hallenge presented by Can-
tor's transnite blueprint has everything to do with the four-term, onto-
epistemologial relevany sheme disussed in Setion 2.3:
RSCN : {ontological relevancy ⇒ onto−epistemic sustainability ⇔ CN}.
Before putting our bak into the foundational business, however, let us
make it lear that our approah is not inspired by, or restrited to a partiular
philosophial or mathematial shool of thought, be it Construtivism (even if
we are quoting with an indubitable sympathy Hermann Weyl's onstrutivist
puns), or Platonism (even if we fully sympathize with Kurt Gödel's Platoni
ditums), or something reasonably else.
Our only riterion of the truth of axiomatis whose onsisteny is either
formally demonstrated or ontextually implied is their explanatory power and
suess, or onto-epistemologial relevany and sustainability, as expressed by
the above four-term RSCN sheme.
Thus, in no way doubting the sienti and mathematial value of any of
the ourishing shools of modern set theory, we assert that any riterion of
axioms plausibility denitely and exlusively equalling onsisteny to truth is
laking substane and strength to seure the onto-epistemologial relevany
and sustainability of its eventual mathematial impliations.
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The below onsisteny-equals-truth redo of W. Hugh Woodin reog-
nizes this by subjeting the truth of an axiom to, in this partiular ase, its
ultimate number theoreti onsequenes ([62℄, p. 31):
For me, granting the truth of the axioms for Set Theory, the only on-
eivable argument against the truth of this axiom [Projetive Determinay
Axiom℄, would be its inonsisteny. I also laim that, at present, the only
redible basis for the belief that the axiom is onsistent is the belief that the
axiom is true. This state of aairs ould hange as the number theoreti
onsequenes of the axiom beome more fully understood.
4.3 Constative vs Performative Axiomati Paradigms:
Performative-Iterative Wishful Axiomati Thinking
Our main foundational argument, developed below, Setion 4.3 onerns the
nature of axioms of Set Theory, from ZF to ZFC to Axioms of Determi-
nay to Axioms of Large Cardinals, whih are typially indutive priniples
and proedures of emergene of set-theoretial entities ating on swaths of
transnite ordinals and ardinals [33℄.
This is why they postulate the harateristis of suh entities at least as
muh as  and probably, transnitly less than  they postulate our ompu-
tational and dedutive proof-theoretial redentials  nite, ountable, and
unountable [47℄, [48℄.
This is also why are misplaed all analogies of set-theoretial axiomatis
with, say, geometri axiomatis, as are misplaed the analogies between fun-
tions dened diretly and by nite proedures  analytially, algebraially,
or number-theoretially  and algorithmially, i.e., by a priori arbitrary re-
ursive funtions and proedures.
Here is just one and, for that matter, well-argued example of the popular
genre of set-theoretial apologetis:
For instane, the proof that the axiom of parallels does not follow from
the other Eulid axioms did not lose geometry, but made the emergene of
non-Eulidian geometries possible, and opened the question of reognizing,
among all possible geometries, the most relevant for desribing the physial
world. Likewise, Gödel's and Cohen's results show that several universes
are possible from ZFC, and, therefore, they open the study of the various
possible universes. [15℄
As a matter of fat, the above analogy only sharpens up our ase:
(1) The Axioms of Eulidean geometry do not generate objets, and being
stritly fat-nding, or onstative, not reative or performative, utteranes,
as Set-Theoretial Axioms, they were arefully distilled by Greek mathemati-
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ians from every-day geometrial experienes, representing straightforward,
almost banal in their simpliity and transpareny abstrations of basi and
immediately and universally observable objets and their relationships.
(2) As to Set-Theoretial Axioms, they are designed mostly ad ho to
urgently and in many ases rather arbitrary ll in the logial and iterative
launas and thus to justify after the fat some risky iterative ights of our
unruly mathematial fany. In short, those are axioms one needs to believe
[41℄ rather than be banally sure of.
(3) As to the emergene of non-Eulidian geometries beoming possible
 in the 19th entury, two thousand years after the Eulidian axiomatis
 this historial fat should be in the rst plae attributed to the general
ultural trend inspired and guided by the aumulation of the sienti ex-
periene related to the geometri relativity and losely assoiated with the
slow replaement of the Ptolemai geoentri system (emerged in the rst
half of the 2nd entury to be later dogmatially asserted in the Western
Christendom) by Copernius' helioentri system made publi in 1543.
(4) This does not mean that we doubt the portability of learning ex-
perienes gained as the result of the passage from the stritly Eulidian to
non-Eulidian geometries. Quite to the ontrary: we believe that there is
an important lesson to learn from this historial experiene  any true rev-
olution in mathematis omes as a fruit of an aquisition of radially novel
ontologial and epistemi, whih means also universal ultural and intelle-
tual, paradigms.
(5) It is also true that, in ontradistintion to geometry, the origins of
modern set-theory were unashamedly metaphysial and even theologial,
as are today the inspirational impulses of new axiomati initiatives.
Cantor himself was quite unapologeti about his motives. Here he is,
writing hundred years ago to Father Thomas Esser in Rome ([43℄, p. 94):
The establishing of the priniples of mathematis and the natural sienes
is the responsibility of metaphysis. Hene metaphysis must look on them as
her hildren and as her servants and helpers, whom she must not let out of
her sight, but must wath over and ontrol, as the queen bee in a hive sends
into the garden thousands of industrious bees, to suk netar from the owers
and then together under her supervision, to turn it into preious honey, and
who must bring her, from the wide realm of the material and spiritual world,
the building bloks to nish her palae.
Today, philosophial and metaphysial insights ontinue to shape  both
impliitly and expliitly and more than any other soure of formal intuition
 the bulk of theologial ventures of modern set theory:
The adaptation of strong axioms of innity is thus a theologial venture,
involving basi questions of belief onerning what is true about the universe.
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However, one an alternatively onstrue work in the theory of large ardi-
nals as formal mathematis, that is to say the investigation of those formal
impliations provable in rst-order logi. ([36℄, p. 104)
4.4 Cantorian Operational and Generative and Hilber-
tian Universal and Argumentative Redutionism
Alert to the Intended Meaning of the Redutionism Dismissal.
The foal point of the following ritial remarks is the dangers of the
redutionist dismissal of ontology in the favor of pre-programmed ideologial
imperatives  one of the main topis of the philosophial interest of the present
study. Our ritiism does not onern the redutionist methodology by itself,
whih is an indispensable and powerful instrument inseparable from the basi
sienti idea of breaking a diult problem into muh more amenable to
formal treatment piees.
All eventual extraneous ritiisms notwithstanding, it was and remains
the redutive enemy within whih is most harmful to the free exerise of a
researher's metaphysial imagination. Thus, Albert Einstein, the disoverer
of physial quants, ould not aept non-loal impliations of the Quantum
Theory beause of his insistene of the universality of loal ausality.
The absolute type of Cantor's redutionism should not be onfused with
his or Gödelian or, for that matter, Finslerian Platonism whih is in priniple
ompatible with an open, emerging universe of ideas about sets.
Rather this militant Redutionism, forefully imposing its pre-oneived,
ontologially rigid and epistemily arbitrary designs on the laws of the do-
main one is supposed to disover and not to invent, was the produt of the
ideologially uniform, peremptory mindset of the XIXth entury's philosophy
of siene.
Other examples abound. In fat, one an assert somewhat shematially
that:
(i) the diversity of the material Universe was redued by Simon-Pierre
Laplae to determinist impliations of the laws of Newtonian Mehanis,
(ii) while the destiny of ivilizations, aording to Karl Marx, is governed
by eonomi laws and struggles of lasses,
(iii) with the natural setion mehanism of Charles Darwin being made
responsible for the diversity, rihes and beauties of the biologial life,
(iv) whereas Sigmund Freud was prolaiming the sexual drive, libido to
be the single fundamental reative fore behind the personal destiny of man.
In the set-theoretial ontext, it was this loal generative redutionist
liability that has most distorted, in the present author's opinion, the future
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development of Set Theory  by insisting on perpetual inventing and piling
up new transnite generative mehanisms as the only remedy to persisting
explanatory launas.
Two of these mehanisms invented by Cantor himself stand out as ap-
parently immediately given: the powerset priniple and the aumulation
of new alephs by transnite indution oming from two dierent and, as we
laim, Chapter 6, ontologially distint and epistemily unrelated soures of
mathematial experiene, the ontinuum and the disrete.
To summarize our grievanes, we ontest here, rst, the blind, automati
extrapolation and extension of these two proedures beyond their original
ontologial matries, respetively: the powerset representation of the on-
tinuum and the universe of ountable ordinals. Similar more is dierent
doubts onerning the redutionist ignoring the sale of the viability and the
emergent nature of established onepts and laws have been raised by physi-
ists [1℄, [40℄. Seond, we ontest the ontologial soundness of the amalgama-
tion of these two proedures into one linear asending ladder (f. Cantor's
formula in the epigraph to Chapter 6.2 below) of ℵ's and i's, Setion 2.6 ...
... And then, in the middle of the rst foundational risis, it was the turn
of David Hilbert to enter the fray with his global argumentative redution-
ism whih was attempting to redue all mathematial reasoning to a fully
formalized mehanial proof-theoreti proedure.
Until, that is, Kurt Gödel's has demonstrated that the unexpeted and
inexpliable are always there to defy our urrently available fully formalized
and assertive self-ondene [64℄.
4.5 Hilbertian, Post-Hilbertian, Gödelian Programs and
Their Gödelian & Post-Gödelian Stumbling-Bloks
David Hilbert's foundational expetations and their brutal refutal by Kurt
Gödel reated the most disheartening paradigm of the formal sienti think-
ing: the stronger are the axiomati foundations or, in other words, the ex-
pressive power of a formal theory, the more inevitably stumbles one upon very
natural and formally admissible in this theory laims whih an be neither
proved nor refuted without some nontrivial extension of the said axiomati
foundations. And in most interesting ases, the extension in question has
to be either the laim itself or  apparently, rather arbitrary and with equal
plausibility  its logial negation ! [5℄, [6℄
The hallenge to reover in this atmosphere of onsisteny relativism the
viable foundations of set theory has been ultimately and, for that matter,
most relutantly aepted by Kurt Gödel.
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Unfortunately, the liberator of the foundational metamathematial re-
searh from the illusions of the Hilbertian argumentative redutionism fell
himself under the spell of the Cantorian ideologial Redutionism asting
itself as Platonism. Most regrettably, disussing the importane and per-
spetives of the Continuum Hypothesis, CH , in his seminal artile [25℄,
Kurt Gödel has wholeheartedly aepted Cantor's transnite design and the
ardinal interpretation of CH . This inexorably led him into advaning a pro-
gram of the searh for new performative axioms of set theory  the axioms
that are strong enough to answer questions left undeided by the standard
axioms ZFC.
Gödel's reputation for perspiaity, prudene, and intelletual integrity
has been apparently deisive in inuening the ensuing gold rush into High
Innite [35℄.
The exesses of this very abstrat, almost ideologial trend ould be or-
reted by a thinker of a more realisti, omputational ast, suh as Alan Tur-
ing who disovered both an alternative, algorithmi interpretation of ount-
able ordinal proedures [58℄ (f. Setion 3.1), and the Halting Barrier, the
undeidability of the Halting Problem, an algorithmi projetion of Gödel's
inompleteness results: there is no halting Turing mahine apable of dis-
tinguishing between halting and non-halting programs [57℄. In other words,
given a program, the only way to disover whether it halts or not is to run
it  possibly, indenitely.
Today, sixty years after the publiation of the rst installment of Gödel's
program [25℄, here is an informal version of suh a orretion:
Thesis 3 : Post-Turing Halting Barrier for Performative Set-theo-
retial Axioms of Iterative Nature.
There exists neither general metamathematial priniple, nor logial ri-
terion, nor veriably terminating omputational proedure to establish the
objetive and substantial truth of a performative set-theoretial axiom of it-
erative nature whih postulates the existene of a transnite objet outside the
already existing (say, ZF−based) transnite sale  otherwise that is than
to run the theory ompleted with the new axiom until it would be disovered
some independent neessary uses of the objet in question.
There is no other modern domain of formal studies where this post-
modern paradigm is so pronouned as in Set Theory and its ZF -based ax-
iomatis. The trouble is hidden exatly where our ZF pride resides: in the
powerful built-in iterative mehanisms of set generation. In other words,
ZF has gained in its reative power on the expense of its desriptive power,
beoming a sophistiated programming language, whih is suessfully mim-
iking some aspets of the Mathematial Innity but whose main thrust lies
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with the providing to advaned users sophistiated options of generation of,
and manipulation with artiial transnite totalities, similarly to omputer
graphi imagery of video games  with the Axiom of Determinay opening
the advent of Innite Games [35℄.
Thanks to this interpretation, nds its proper plae, in partiular, the
puzzling and disonerting predominane in modern set theory of results on
ZF onsisteny and independeny:
When modern set theory is applied to onventional mathematial prob-
lems, it has a disonerting tendeny to produe independene results rather
than theorems in the usual sense. The resulting preoupation with `onsis-
teny' rather than `truth' may be felt to give the subjet an air of unreality.
([52℄, p. 197)
Finally, we laim that all suh onsisteny results are just the instanes
of suessful program veriation.
In other words, the totalities in question are, in fat, pure mathemat-
ial notations not related to any set-theoretial reality outside the tight
struture of their denitions and relationships whih might turn out to be
suggestive of our permanently evolving iterative programming ability:
Only the rst few levels of the umulative hierarhy bear any resemblane
to external reality. The rest are a huge extrapolation based on a rude model
of abstrat thought proesses. Gödel himself omes lose to admitting as
muh. ([54℄, p. 362)
These a fortiori set-theoretial observations and related logial heuristis
suggest the following informal thesis whih projets Gödel's inompleteness
theorems into the realm of the emerging art of mathematial novelization:
Thesis 4 : On the Post-Gödelian Inompleteness.
Any oneptually suiently rih and logially/axiomatially suiently
sophistiated mathematial system allows a huge, super-exponentially expand-
ing mathematial si- novelization  the reation of a multitude of math-
ematial si- novels, i.e., fully onsistent mathematial theories with unlim-
itedly extending axiomati bases  fored themselves upon us, as it were, not
only as being true ([?℄, p. 268) but being also intelletually ompelling and
esthetially attrative  and yet whih do not have in their (more than) over-
whelming majority, either at this junture or whenever in future, any obje-
tively veriable mathematial and/or substantial extra-mathematial meaning
outside the proper, self-absorbed sene of formal dedutions inside the system
in question.
Criterion 1 Sustainability Criterion of Viability.
(1) This new mathematial reality suggests the following Onto-Epistemi
Sustainability Criterion of Viability: an axiomati should ultimately stik as
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lose as possible to the onto-epistemologially sustainable notions and rela-
tionships of the underlying mathematial domains:
RSCN : ontological relevancy ⇒ onto−epistemological sustainability ⇔ CN},
(2) The qualier ultimately to the above assertive stik to is here not
only to intimate that our Criterion of Viability is unenforeable and, thus,
voluntary. It is also a warning justied by the urrent mathematial experi-
ene, and not only set-theoretial, that axiomati eorts in a theory with a
rih ontologial base ould produe attrative and apparently plausible onje-
tures and problems of monster logial and proof-theoretial omplexity, with
the daunting task to prove or disprove them amounting to the mobilization of
intelletual eorts of all humanity for some enturies.
(3) The examples of the Ptolemai astronomi system and of the famous
unresolved mathematial problems of Greeks onrm suh an eventuality 
even if on a oneptually muh more modest sale. It means that the math-
ematially free-market, easy-going attitude toward the hoie of, and the
level of human and institutional investments into the mathematial domain
should be somehow assisted by responsible and trusted orales. This said,
our pundits ould be also wrong, as we believe was wrong Kurt Gödel direting
us into the Large Cardinals morass.
5 Nostalgi Interlude. From the Innity above
to the Innity below: Continuum & Ordinals
In his spiritual autobiography, the famous Russian writer and thinker Lev
Nikolayevih Tolstoy transripts his night dream, somewhen in 1879, of lying
on his bak in a bed and trying to onsider how and on what was [he℄ lying
 a question whih had not till then ourred to him [56℄ (pp. 46-47):
And observing my bed, I saw I was lying on plaited string supports at-
tahed to its sides. ... I seemed to know that those supports were movable.
... I made a movement with my whole body to adjust myself, fully onvined
that I ould do it at one; but the movement aused the ... supports under
me to slip and to beome entangled, and I saw that matters were going quite
wrong. ... I looked down and did not believe my eyes. ... I ould not even
make out whether I saw anything there below, in that bottomless abyss over
whih I was hanging and whither I was being drawn. My heart ontrated,
and I experiened horror. ... What am I to do ? What am I to do ? I
ask myself, and look upwards. Above, there is also an innite spae. I look
into the immensity of sky and try to forget about the immensity below, and
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I really do forget it. ... I know that I am hanging, but I look more and more
into the innite above me and feel that I am beoming alm. ... And then,
as happen! s in dreams, I imagined the mehanism by means of whih I was
held; a very natural intelligible, and sure means, though on one awake that
mehanism has no sense.
Compare this with Hermann Weyl's nal remarks to his short and luid
review of the foundational eorts set in motion by the disovery of logial
paradoxes, the hallenge whih had not till then ourred to mathematiians:
From this history one thing should be lear: we are less ertain than ever
about the ultimate foundations of (logi and) mathematis. Like everybody
and everything in the world today, we have our risis. We have had it for
nearly fty years. Outwardly it does not seem to hamper our daily work, and
yet I for one onfess that it has had a onsiderable pratial inuene on
my mathematial life: it direted my interests to elds I onsidered relatively
safe, and it has been a onstant drain on my enthusiasm and determination
with whih I pursued my researh work. The experiene is probably shared by
other mathematiians who are not indierent to what their sienti endeav-
ours mean in the ontexts of man's whole aring and knowing, suering and
reative existene in the world. ([59℄, p. 13)
Today, hundred years after the emergene of the rst foundational risis
in Mathematis, an ordinary mathematiian surfs fearlessly on an opportune
wave of new oneptional and formal breakthroughs, arrying out routinely
all neessary to him operations, whether they are supposed to be arried out
by God or by men.
And yet, his arelessness does not aet in the slightest the reality and
importane of the abyss below his feet  Ordinal transnite, Chapter 3 
and the immensity of the innity above his head  the mathematial habitat
alled Continuum, Chapter 2, assoiated with, and deriving its permanently
renewing onto-epistemologial relevany and suggestive power from our be-
ing ative in the presene of the reality ow  the ow thought of as an ever
ongoing, fully external to us, independent of us, and most rih phenomeno-
logially proess (Setion 2.2).
Thesis 5 : Two Soures of Mathematial Innity.
(1) Sine at least three thousand years, the Countable and the Continuum
represented two soures of the mathematial intuition assoiated today with
Mathematial Innity.
(2) All set-theoretial axioms and innity notations notwithstanding, the
exlusivity of these soures has been onrmed by the mathematial develop-
ments of the last entury.
(3) There exist no other ontologial soures of Mathematial Innity.
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This informal laim omplements and generalizes our Continuum Hypoth-
esis Thesis, Setion 2.5.
6 Loal Causation of Man's Mathematis Ver-
sus Non-Loality of Classial Mathematis
Our point of view is to desribe the mathematial
operations that an be arried out by nite beings,
man's mathematis for short.
In ontrast, lassial mathematis onerns itself
with operations that an be arried out by God.
Errett Bishop [11℄, p. 9.
6.1 The Continuum, Suslin's Problem, Loal Causation,
Quantum Non-loality, and Churh-Turing Thesis
And what about other, lassial and `divine' Mathematis (as Errett Bishop's
has hosen to desried it)? How about Mathematis of a free surng on the
real line ontinuum, starting with the logially unimpeded Classial Analysis
and passing by the famous and still open Suslin's onjeture?
Problem 1 : Suslin's Conjeture.
Let K be a linearly ordered set without the rst or last element, onneted
in order topology, with no unountable family of pairwise disjoint open inter-
vals. Is K isomorphi to the real line R?([39℄, p. 66)
Thesis 6 : Non-Loality Charaterization of the Continuum.
(1)The striking feature of lassial analyti mahinery oneived to deal
with, and perfetly adapted to the Continuum habitat, and whih immediately
distinguish it from methods and theories subjet to the disrete, Ordinal Anal-
ysis related treatment, is its intrinsi, inextinguishable, fundamental, outside
of the Continuum not existing and not obtainable non-loality, in the sense
this term is understood in Quantum Information Proessing, or QIP, for
short [46℄.
(2) Any phenomenologially and ontologially faithful or at least relevant
axiomatization of the Continuum should inlude a Non-loality Postulate, or
Non-loality Axiomati Sheme, to formally aount for the following prop-
erty of the Continuum:
All `points', or `elements' of the Continuum are non-loally, i.e., simul-
taneously and at any moment, aessible. This non-loal aessibility extends
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to all well-dened `slies' (subsets in the set-theoretial terminology) of the
Continuum.
Comments and Impliations: From Aristotle to Suslin to Churh-
Turing Thesis. (1) The quoted above laim of Aristotle about the mathe-
matial suieny of the sphere of real magnitudes expliitly denies among
other things suh a non-loality haraterization of the Continuum. One an
only admire the leverness, unambiguity, and onsisteny of Aristotle, the
father of formal logi, who was stiking on this oasion to his and his ol-
leagues, from Zenon to Eulid, disrete, loal ausality interpretation of math-
ematis. For the sake of ompleteness and faility of the understanding our
argument, we reprodue here Aristotle's ditum (see for details Setion 2.3):
In point of fat they [mathematiians℄ do not need the innite and do not
use it. They postulate only that the nite straight line may be produed as far
as they wish. It is possible to have divided in the same ration as the largest
quantity another magnitude of any size you like. Hene, for the purposes of
proof, it will make no dierene to them to have suh an innite instead,
while its existene will be in the sphere of real magnitudes.
(2)We believe that, the availability of a Non-Loality Postulate in a mod-
ied ZF -like axiomatis  our powerset and ordinal limitations of size being
assured, Setions 2.6, 3.1  Suslin's onjeture beomes an easily provable
statement (we will be bak to this laim in our forthoming paper).
(3) To make these observations amendable to an eventual formalization,
Setion 6.2 below, let us turn our attention to Robert Gandy's well-known
real-life analysis [23℄ of Churh's and Turing's omputability, and in partiu-
lar, to Gandy's Priniple of Loal Causation, as it is informally and suintly
summarized by David Israel ([32℄, p. 197):
Causal eets must be loally propagated ... There is an upper bound
(e.g., the veloity of light) on the speed of propagation of hanges. ... There
is no (unbounded) ation at a distane; no simultaneous ausation.
(4) After adding to these priniple three other, more material and routine
Priniples of Mehanism, Gandy demonstrates that, rst, funtions om-
putable on suh abstrat devies are simply the Turing-omputable fun-
tions, thus adding a striking bit of evidene for the adequay and stability of
Turing's analysis (ibid.), and seond, that eah of these four onditions is
neessary to avoid either absurdity, or  espeially, in the ase of the Prini-
ple of Loal Causation  indisriminate, over-reahing appliability and not
restrited to reursive funtions omputability.
(5) In a similar vein, Nahum Dershowitz and Yuri Gurevith [17℄ have
reently identied three interrelated Sequential Postulates [27℄ whih repre-
sent an algorithmi axiomatization of omputability allowing for a proof of
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Churh's and Turing's theses, with the rst of these postulates representing
an algorithmi equivalent of Gandy's Priniple of Loal Causation.
6.2 Ordinal Construtions Abide by Priniples of Loal
Causation
Following the nite there is a transnite, that is
an unbounded asending ladder of denite modes,
whih by their nature are not nite but innite,
but whih just like the nite an be determined
by denite well-dened and distinguishable num-
bers [notations℄.
Georg Cantor, 1883, as translated in [28℄ (p. 39)
Cantor's unbounded asending ladder of innite modes is sequential by
its very denition  and, thus, abiding by the transnite version of the Prin-
iple of Loal Causation, whih assumes in this ase the form of
Axiom 2 : Priniple of Transnite Indution.
Suppose Ω is a well-ordered totality (set or lass), with elements α, β, . . ..
• Indution Hypothesis. Suppose the formula φ(β) holds for all β < α.
• Indutive Step. Suppose that one an prove that whenever the above
Indution Hypothesis is veried, the formula φ(α) holds as well.
• Indutive Conlusion. Then φ holds for all elements of Ω.
(Cf., e.g., the disussion of the Indution priniple by Joseph R. Shoeneld
in [3℄ (p. 332))
6.3 Non-Loal Causation of Quantum Algorithms
With the disovery of physial, quantum-theoretial non-loality and quan-
tum entanglement (from EPR paradox,1935, to Bell's inequalities, 1964, to
Aspet's experimental onrmation 1982) and its appliability to QIP, non-
loal ausation of quantum entanglements beame the soure of dramati
improvements in the eieny of algorithmi solutions of some important
problems, suh for example, as the fatorization of natural numbers [46℄.
The radial novelty of quantum algorithms is their high intrinsi paral-
lelism, in ontradistintion to the extrinsi, limited, ad ho parallelism of
lassial algorithms.
In other words, the parallelism of a partiular lassial deterministi al-
gorithm (deploying this suggestive foundational analogy, we do not need to
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ompliate matters by onsidering non-deterministi algorithms) ould be
ahieved only at the seond stage of its onstrution, the rst stage being
its stritly sequential oneption and realization of all of its steps  bearing
on, mirroring, and mimiking deterministi proesses of lassial physis. To
this should be added that the funtioning of a lassial omputer exeuting
suh an algorithm ould be heked, at least in priniple, at any moment and
in any of its physial bits without interrupting its alulations.
As to the funtioning of a quantum omputer (as yet, at least materially, a
si- dream), it bears on, mirrors, and mimis quantum-theoretial proesses,
and any attempt to hek the state of one of its qubits would irreparably
orrupt alulations. A quantum algorithm, as its lassial ompanion, is
built in basi sequential stages, or routines, but, in the dierene of a lassial
algorithm, it does not program the exeution of a stage when it represents a
genuine quantum proess playing out on a arefully hosen bunh of qubits.
In other words, arriving at suh a stage, the algorithm programs the
initial tuple of quantum states of the bunh and direts the quantum ow 
of information through a arefully hosen sequene of quantum operators 
exatly in the same way as one might diret the ow of water in an irrigation
system, without being aware of, interested in, and being able to hek what
might happen with a partiular moleule or bigger portion of water.
At the end of this loosely ontrolled ow of parallel proesses, the algo-
rithm is supposed to hek one or more numeri harateristis of some of
the qubits involved (quantum operation of measuring), thus destroying the
ongoing proess, but olleting piees of information whih are used either as
a part of the output, or at next quantum stages, or for adjusting the global
strategy, or for a ombination of all these purposes.
6.4 Fundamental Objet-Subjet Duality of Mathemat-
is. Loal Causation Case
It would be fair to aknowledge that, at the present junture, the prospets
of a radial improvement of the strength, exibility, universality, and user-
friendliness of algorithmi methods of QIP, not to speak of the hallenges
of their hardware realizations, are seriously hampered by the extreme nar-
rowness of the only open today window of genuinely quantum-theoretial
opportunities: the entanglement phenomenon.
The urrent state of QIP aairs should not prevent us from fully apprei-
ate an epistemi and explanatory potential of the non-loality onept  the
potential unimpeded by the urrently pereived limits of quantum algorith-
mi non-loality and bearing on a mysterious duality between non-disrete,
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non-loal ontinuum phenomena in (logially unrestrited) Mathematis and
non-disrete and non-loal nature of (proof-theoretially unrestrited) Math-
ematial Reasoning.
In partiular, there is no doubt that the Construtivist grievanes ex-
pressed above so eloquently by the late Errett Bishop (the epigraph to Chap-
ter 6) have something to do with the exlusively sequential, deterministi,
and loal harater of mathematial reasoning and veriation aepted by
the Construtivist shool.  Whereas a Classial mathematiian permits
himself to freely y over, or surf along the ontinuum ow, and to do this
in a formally irresponsible, i.e., essentially non-loal, non-sequential, and
non-deterministi from the Aristotelian logis point of view, way.
We will approah this hypotheti general duality from below, in three loal
ausation steps, starting with the most primitive, and yet already very robust
and highly important level of Mathematial Reasoning  Computation, the
Mathematis that an be arried out by nite beings (Errett Bishop, f. the
epigraph above) named robots, or omputers.
Thesis 7 First Duality Priniple: Finitist Mathematis Abides by
Loal Causation.
• Construtivism is the branh of Mathematis with the voation of de-
signing onstrutive denitions (of reation) of nite mathematial objets
and of operations on suh objets. Construtive methods are nitist, dis-
rete, and of loal ausation nature.
• Classial Theory of Computing (Turing Mahine, Churh's λ−alulus,
et.) has the voation of empowering people with formal nite and disrete
omputational mehanisms abiding by the ondition of loal ausation, to
manipulate objets of onstrutive nature using onstrutive operations.
The next level of our universal duality thesis orresponds more or less to
Errett Bishop's dream of man's mathematis, alias Stephen G. Simpson's
aforementioned ountable mathematis ([55℄, p. 1).
We speak here about problem solving and proof-theoreti analysis whih
ould be arried out in subsystems of Seond Order Arithmeti Z2 [55℄ un-
der the umbrella of the Countable Ordinal Analysis whih employs Ordinal
Arithmeti on ountable ordinals. Ordinal Arithmeti on ountable ordinals
has the primary purpose of designing systems of ordinal notations to name
eah ordinal in ertain initial streth of the ountable ordinals (f., e.g., [53℄,
p. 65). Aording to the above analysis, Setion 6.2, Countable Ordinal
Arithmeti is of a demonstratively loal ausation nature.
Thesis 8 Seond Duality Priniple: Countable Mathematis Abides
By Loal Causation.
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• The objets of Countable Mathematis are number-theoretial, ombi-
natorial, and analyti theories onstruted from axioms of good-behaving sub-
systems of Seond Order Arithmeti, as well propositions, provable in suh
theories.
• Proof-theoreti mahinery employing Countable Ordinal Analysis has
the voation of empowering people with means to both analyze the ordinal rank
or omplexity of suh theories and propositions (properly Ordinal analysis
[48℄) and to determine the minimal in its ordinal omplexity set of axioms
needed to proof a partiular proposition (Reverse Mathematis [53℄).
The last loally ausal level of our universal duality thesis should or-
respond to the ase of Prediativity. In one of its ompletely settled in-
terpretations, the prediativity attribute belongs to Countable Mathematis,
being of the Feferman-Shütte ordinal rank Γ0 (alled therefore the least non-
prediatively provable ountable ordinal), and thus, belongs to our Seond
Duality Thesis.
However, taking in aount the fat that the intuitive notion of predia-
tivity is far from being settled, persisting to remain informal with Solomon
Ferferman's last unfolding onept, we will restrit ourselves here to the re-
mark that the very attribute of unfolding ([19℄, p. 614) perfetly ts in our
interpretation of loal ausation.
7 Non-Loality of Classial Mathematis Ver-
sus Loal Causation of Man's Mathematis
7.1 Making the Case For a Synthesis of the Realist and
Platoni Coneptions of Mathematis
We are prepared now to treat a oneption of Mathematis tting in Georg
Cantor's original, optimisti epistemi vision, the oneption both most gen-
eral from the mathematial pratitioner's point of view and most generous
from the point of view of a logiian.
The epistemi framework we adopt here is both Platoni whenever we
deal with the objetivity and striking relevany  or, in Eugene Paul Wigner's
words, the unreasonable eetiveness [61℄  of the ow of the mathematial
knowledge in natural sienes, and Realist whenever we need to treat the
question of the atual existene of mathematial objets whose notations
and properties are the real, and only, subjets of any formal mathematial
study.
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In other words, we do not follow the unabashed, extrovert Platonism of
Georg Cantor and, to some degree, of Kurt Gödel so far as, e.g., to reognize
sets as having independent of human denitions existene. And yet, we
do assume that, say, the two millenarian quest for the mystery of the real
ontinuum has the merit to bring o orret and pithy presentations of some
objetively existing aspets of the real world, the aspets whih, prior to
any formalization, are the subjet of our mathematial intuition.
Still, those will be not these aspets whih we are attempting to expliitly
aommodate in our epistemi and formal framework, but the free ow of
mathematially eaious and formally attrative onstrutions and theories
inspired by this intuition  and we are intending to arry on this aommoda-
tion without any logial or philosophial preoneptions of the last entury's
metamathematial shools.
We believe that in hoosing this middle way between the Sylla of a free
wheeling Idealism and Charybdis of a disiplinarian's Pragmatism, we remain
faithful to Georg Cantor's original intuition of Mathematial Innity, all his
post-fatum Platoni justiations notwithstanding.
As, for example, in the following famous, theologially olored remark,
Cantor atually defends not the objetive, independent of us existene of
transnite totalities but the free, unimpeded modus operandi of the Creator
of the Universe  and thus, nolens volens, our own intelletual freedom  to
disover the formal traes of what is aptured by Mathematial Innity and
to treat them where, when, and however it might be worth one's while:
I am so in favor of the atual innite that instead of admitting that
Nature abhors it, as is ommonly said, I hold that Nature makes frequent
use of it everywhere, in order to show more eetively the perfetions of its
Author. (As quoted in [14℄, p. 124.)
7.2 The Objet-Subjet Duality of Mathematis. Non-
Loality Case: Heuristis
Contrary to the above duality theses, Setion 6.4, our hoies of Objet
and Subjet of Mathematis abiding by non-loality ausation annot be
as spei, and the orresponding non-loality thesis will remain heuristi.
It will be soon lear why it should be so and what it would take to formally
advane our understanding of, and mastering Mathematis free from loality
onstrains.
• An Instane of a Mathematial Objet Abiding by Non-Loal Causation.
To begin with, onsider the setting of Zeno's paradox Ahilles and the Tor-
toise onsisting of two independent, simultaneously unfolding, objetive
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mathematial proesses: the Tortoise's steady advanement along the real
line R and Ahilles ever shortened strides along the same line. Ahilles strat-
egy and its realization are familiar to us: they are disrete, reursive, abiding
by loal ausation.
But what about the Tortoise's ? Why is Zeno suggesting that hers is a
more enigmati logial and mathematial enterprise, the enterprise inom-
patible or diultly ompatible with man's mathematis of Errett Bishop ?
 By the way, it is not by hane that Zeno has hosen a man, Ahilles, who
has to ath up with a fabulously slow and yet mysteriously unattainable
Tortoise.
The answer, we believe, is that Zeno allots to the Tortoise the divine
ability to almly swim along the ow of the ontinuum, whereas Ahilles,
the man, has no hoie but to dangerously hang over the bottomless depths
of this primeval ontinuum stream, being able to advane only by jumping
from a one point-size loation on this stream  the loation arefully hosen
and temporally frozen solid  to the next one.
In other words, Zeno's paradox suggests, rst, that the real ontinuum
R  at any given moment of our onsiderations  divinely (taking Errett
Bishop's at his word) exists in our intuition, simultaneously with all its on-
tinuum points, intervals, et.  the senario learly implying some non-loal
ausation  and seond, that any spei mathematial question implying R
annot be humanly resolved but within an appropriate disrete, sequential
mathematial framework abiding by a loal ausation priniple.
So muh about the aspets of non-loal ausation in our intuitive perep-
tion of the real ontinuum.
7.3 Non-Loality. Interpretation & Foundational Impli-
ations I: Logial Paradoxes, Cirularity, and Truth
Moreover, we laim that the disovery, by Bertrand Russel and his follow-
ers, of logial paradoxes haraterized by self-referentiality, or as it is known
today irularity of formal arguments [21℄  suh as Russel's set of all sets
whih are not elements of themselves or Liar paradoxes [42℄  were, and
to some extent, remain just new, surprising, and to the pioneers and early
pratitioners of our siene, historially painful manifestations of the au-
thentiity and fundamentality of Zeno's and Everrett Bishop's prediament:
how to represent an essentially and irremediably non-loal divine reality by
man's sequential loal ausality arguments.
Making the Point 6 : Two Types of Logial Paradoxes Reeting
Two Soures of Unertainty about the Truth of Mathematial and
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Logial Claims.
(1) Russel's paradox simulates the unavoidable irularity of some def-
initions of set theory and of the original, full-blown, non-onstrutive and
non-prediative system of analysis. As Zeno's paradox, it pushes to its ab-
surd limits a onventional wisdom about the human ability to instantly and
yet orretly appreiate a omplex, dynamial, nonloal by its very nature
reality. Whereas in Zeno's ase Ahilles possesses the faulty of an instant
observation of the Tortoise's position but is artiially deprived of the faulty
of instant prevision onerning her future positions, Russel's paradox plays in
a similar way with human faulties to be instantly formally orret in a very
seletively, syntatially understood way  but to pitifully fail semantially.
(2) As to Liar paradoxes, from simple to strengthened ones, they play
with the natural languages ability to treat nonloal reality, nonloal both tem-
porally  i.e., outside the limits of instantaneousness  and spatially but
also relationally, in a formally ambiguous but perfetly understandable and
workable way.
7.4 Non-Loality. Interpretation & Foundational Im-
pliations II: Problem Solving, Theorem Proving,
Theories Building
• Mathematial Subjet Abiding by Non-Loal Causation. As a matter of
ourse, similar aspets of non-loality are present in the treatment of all ases
of innite, or even nite but immensely big mathematial strutures. In fat a
good pratitioner should always have a global, all-embraing, instantaneous,
non-loal in its ausation, intuitive grasp of strutures of interest to him,
both exemplied and pushed to its limits by Srinivasa Ramanujan's (1887-
1920) intimate familiarity with numbers ([29℄, p. 12) and his general way
of doing mathematis  by showing astonishing imaginative power , even
if as always, proving next to nothing [29℄ (p. 15). Two other young and
tragially early departed mathematial geniuses, Niels Henrik Abel (1802-
1829) and Evarist Galois (1811-1832), have left to the posterity not less rih
and original visions of both never before observed mathematial landsapes
and mathematial laws by whih these landsapes abide  but not muh, or
not at all, traes of dedutive rigor and very little, if at all, proofs.
From the epistemi level of Computation, we have already asended  up
the ladder of epistemi non-triviality and intrinsi oneptual omplexity of
mathematial hallenges  to Theorem Proving, Axiomatizing, Consisteny,
Independeny, and Ordinal Strength of axiomati studies. Doing this, we
were following the metamathematial praties of the 20th entury whih
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have suessfully formalized, ustomized, and perfeted omputational and
proof-theoreti methods and skills  always abiding, as it has been demon-
strated above, Chapter 6, by loal ausation priniples.
The next step should dispense us with this fundamental restrition and
to bring rst, still tentative, fuzzy, and yet indubitable insights into what
might one day beome Mathematis with Non-Loal Causation.
There is not muh preedents for, and apparently no preursors of suh
an enterprise. The following historial remark by Igor R. Shafarevih gives
the losest known to the present author t for an extrinsi  as antonymous
to intrinsi, in other words, epistemi, i.e., of ommanding interest to the
present study  foretaste of the enigma of non-loal ausation:
Viewed superially, Mathematis is the result of enturies of eort by
many thousands of largely unonneted individuals sattered aross onti-
nents, enturies and millennia. However, the internal logi of its development
muh more resembles the work of a single intellet developing its thought in a
ontinuous and systemati way, and only using as a means a multipliity of
human individualities, muh as in an orhestra playing a symphony written
by some omposer the theme moves from one instrument to another so that
as soon as one performer is fored to ut short his part, it is taken up by
another player, who ontinues it with due attention to the sore. [51℄ (p.
182)
Without pretending to fully understand, let alone to endorse the pre-
sumed by the above statement providential harater of the progress in
Mathematis driven by apparently unrelated eorts of a dispersed and dis-
onneted olletivity of professionals, we hoose to apply here Shafarevih's
noble vision of new, emerging mathematial artifats and theories to the work
of an individual: as a simultaneous, harmoniously oordinated exeution of,
say, a symphony by a band of players, i.e., her or his disparate, almost
unrelated, in many ases most illogial insights playing the whole thing out
without any restraints of loal ausation.
Moreover, we see the authenti voation of Non-Loal Causation Mathe-
matis asMetamathematis of Emerging Mathematial Objets, Claims, The-
ories:
Thesis 9 Third Duality Priniple: Non-Loal Causation in Prob-
lem Solving, Theorem Proving, Theories Building.
With the emergene of non-loal ausation in the treatment of the afore-
mentioned hallenges, we are formally approahing the next level of mathe-
matial reasoning: the emergene, sometimes, simultaneously or in a asual
order, rst, of initially only intuitively pereived new mathematial stru-
tures, aompanied by an intuitive oneption of eventual laims onerning
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these strutures, and followed by an intuitive searh for proofs of suh laims.
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